Adversarial Edit Attacks for Tree Data by Paaßen, Benjamin
ar
X
iv
:1
90
8.
09
36
4v
2 
 [c
s.L
G]
  2
7 A
ug
 20
19
Adversarial Edit Attacks for Tree Data
Benjamin Paaßen
CITEC Center of Excellence, Bielefeld University∗
Preprint of the IDEAL 2019 paper Paaßen [2019] as provided by the authors.
Abstract
Many machine learning models can be attacked with adversarial examples, i.e. in-
puts close to correctly classified examples that are classified incorrectly. However, most
research on adversarial attacks to date is limited to vectorial data, in particular image
data. In this contribution, we extend the field by introducing adversarial edit attacks
for tree-structured data with potential applications in medicine and automated program
analysis. Our approach solely relies on the tree edit distance and a logarithmic number
of black-box queries to the attacked classifier without any need for gradient information.
We evaluate our approach on two programming and two biomedical data sets and
show that many established tree classifiers, like tree-kernel-SVMs and recursive neural
networks, can be attacked effectively.
1 Introduction
In recent years, multiple papers have demonstrated that machine learning classifiers can be
fooled by adversarial examples, i.e. an example x′ that is close to a correctly classified data
point x, but is classified incorrectly [Akhtar and Mian, 2018, Madry et al., 2018]. The threat
of such attacks is not to be underestimated, especially in security-critical applications such as
medicine or autonomous driving, where adversarial examples could lead to misdiagnoses or
crashes [Eykholt et al., 2018].
Despite this serious threat to all classification models, existing research has almost ex-
clusively focused on image data [Akhtar and Mian, 2018, Madry et al., 2018], with the no-
table exceptions of a few contributions on audio data [Carlini and Wagner, 2018], text data
[Ebrahimi et al., 2018], and graph data [Dai et al., 2018, Zügner et al., 2018]. In particular,
no adversarial attack approach has yet been developed for tree data, such as syntax trees
of computer programs or biomedical molecules. Furthermore, all attack approaches for non-
image data to date rely on knowledge about the classifier architecture and/or gradient, which
may not always be available [Madry et al., 2018].
In this paper, we address both issues by introducing adversarial edit attacks, a novel
black-box attack scheme for tree data. In particular, we propose to select for a point x a
neighboring point with a different label y, compute the tree edits necessary to change x into
y, and applying the minimum number of edits which still change the classifier output.
Our paper is structured as follows. We first introduce background and related work
on adversarial examples, then introduce our adversarial attack method, and finally evaluate
our method by attacking seven different tree classifiers on four tree data sets, two from the
programming domain and two from the biomedical domain.
∗Support by the Bielefeld Young Researchers Fund is gratefully acknowledged.
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2 Related Work
Following Szegedy et al. [Szegedy et al., 2014], we define an adversarial example for some
data point x ∈ X and a classifier f : X → {1, . . . , L} and a target label ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , L} as the
solution z to the following optimization problem
min
z∈X ,s.t.f(z)=ℓ
d(z, x)2, (1)
where d is a distance on the data space X . In other words, z is the closest data point to x
which is still classified as ℓ. For image data, the distance d(z, x) is often so small that z and
x look exactly the same to human observers [Szegedy et al., 2014].
Note that Problem 1 is hard to solve because X is typically high dimensional and the
constraint f(z) = ℓ is discrete. Accordingly, the problem has been addressed with heuristic
approaches, such as the fast gradient sign method [Goodfellow et al., 2015], which changes
x along the sign of the gradient of the classifier loss; or Carlini-Wagner attacks, which
incorporate the discrete label constraint as a differentiable term in the objective function
[Carlini and Wagner, 2017]. We call these methods white-box because they all rely on knowl-
edge of the architecture and/or gradient ∇zf(z) of the classifier. In contrast, there also
exist black-box attack methods, which only need to query f itself, such as one-pixel at-
tacks, which are based on evolutionary optimization instead of gradient-based optimization
[Akhtar and Mian, 2018, Su et al., 2017].
In the realm of non-image data, prior research has exclusively focused on white-box attacks
for specific data types and/or models. In particular, [Carlini and Wagner, 2018] consider audio
files, relying on decibels and the CTC loss as measure of distance; [Ebrahimi et al., 2018]
attack text data by inferring single character replacements that increase the classification
loss; and [Dai et al., 2018, Zügner et al., 2018] attack graph data by inferring edge deletions
or insertions which fool a graph convolutional neural network model.
Our own approach is related to [Carlini and Wagner, 2018], in that we rely on an align-
ment between two inputs to construct adversarial examples, and to [Ebrahimi et al., 2018], in
that we consider discrete node-level changes, i.e. node deletions, replacements, or insertions.
However, in contrast to these prior works, our approach is black-box instead of white-box and
works in tree data as well as sequence data.
3 Method
To develop an adversarial attack scheme for tree data, we face two challenges. First, Problem 1
requires a distance function d for trees. Second, we need a method to apply small changes to
a tree x in order to construct an adversarial tree z. We can address both challenges with the
tree edit distance, which is defined as the minimum number of node deletions, replacements,
or insertions needed to change a tree into another [Zhang and Shasha, 1989] and thus provides
both a distance and a change model.
Formally, we define a tree over some finite alphabet A recursively as an expression T =
x(T1, . . . , Tm), where x ∈ A and where T1, . . . , Tm is a (possibly empty) list of trees over A.
We denote the set of all trees over A as T (A). As an example, a(), a(b), and a(b(a, a), a)
are both trees over the alphabet A = {a, b}. We define the size of a tree T = x(T1, . . . , Tm)
recursively as |T | := 1 +
∑m
c=1 |Tc|.
Next, we define a tree edit δ over alphabet A as a function δ : T (A) → T (A). In more
detail, we consider node deletions deli, replacements repi,a, and insertions insi,c,C,a, which
respectively delete the ith node in the input tree and move its children up to the parent,
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Figure 1: An illustration of the effect of the tree edit script δ¯ = del2, rep4,f, ins1,2,1,g on the
tree (a(b(c,d), e)). We first delete the second node of the tree, then replace the fourth node
with an f, and finally insert a g as second child of the first node, using the former second child
as grandchild.
x y
z1 ×
z2 X
Figure 2: Two adversarial attack attempts, one random (z1) and one backtracing attack (z2).
z1 is constructed by moving randomly in the space of possible trees until the label changes.
z2 is constructed by moving along the connecting line to the closest neighbor with different
label y until the label changes. z1 is not counted as successful, because it is closer to y than
to x, whereas z2 is counted as successful. The background pattern indicates the predicted
label of the classifier.
relabel the ith node in the input tree with symbol a ∈ A, and insert a new node with label a
as cth child of node i, moving former children c, . . . , c+C down. Figure 1 displays the effects
of each edit type.
We define an edit script as a sequence δ¯ = δ1, . . . , δn of tree edits δj and we define the
application of δ¯ to a tree T recursively as δ¯(T ) := (δ2, . . . , δn)
(
δ1(T )
)
. Figure 1 displays an
example edit script.
Finally, we define the tree edit distance d(x, y) as the length of the shortest script which
transforms x into y, i.e. d(x, y) := minδ¯:δ¯(x)=y |δ¯|. This tree edit distance can be computed
efficiently via dynamic programming in O(|x|2 · |y|2) [Zhang and Shasha, 1989]. We note that
several variations of the tree edit distance with other edit models exist, which are readily
compatible with our approach [Bille, 2005, Paaßen et al., 2018]. For brevity, we focus on the
classic tree edit distance in this paper.
Random baseline attack: The concept of tree edits yields a baseline attack approach for
trees. Starting from a tree x with label f(x), we apply random tree edits, yielding another
tree z, until f(z) 6= f(x). To make this more efficient, we double the number of edits in
each iteration until f(z) 6= f(x), yielding an edit script δ¯ = δ1, . . . , δn, and then use binary
search to identify the shortest prefix δ¯j := δ1, . . . , δj such that f
(
(δ1, . . . , δj)(x)
)
6= f(x). This
reduced the number of queries to O(log(n)).
Note that this random attack scheme may find solutions z which are far away from x,
thus limiting the plausibility as adversarial examples. To account for such cases, we restrict
Problem 1 further and impose that z only counts as a solution if z is still closer to x than to
any point y which is correctly classified and has a different label than x (refer to Figure 2).
Another drawback of our random baseline is that it can not guarantee results after a
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fixed amount of edits because we may not yet have explored enough trees to have crossed
the classification boundary. We address this limitation with our proposed attack method,
backtracing attacks.
Backtracing attack: For any two trees x and y, we can compute a co-optimal edit script
δ¯ with δ¯(x) = y and |δ¯| = d(x, y) in O(|x| · |y| · (|x|+ |y|)) via a technique called backtracing
[Paaßen, 2018, refer to Algorithm 6 and Theorem 16]. This forms the basis for our proposed
attack. In particular, we select for a starting tree x the closest neighbor y with the target
label ℓ, i.e. f(y) = ℓ. Then, we use backtracing to compute the shortest script δ¯ from x to
y. This script is guaranteed to change the label at some point. We then apply binary search
to identify the shortest prefix of δ¯ which still changes the label (refer to Figure 2). Refer to
Algorithm 1 for the details of the algorithm.
Algorithm 1 A targeted adversarial edit algorithm which transforms the input tree x to
move it closer to a reference tree y with the desired target label ℓ. The backtracing algorithm
for the tree edit distance ted-backtrace is described in [Paaßen, 2018].
1: function targeted(A tree x, a classifier f , and a reference tree y with f(y) = ℓ.)
2: δ1, . . . , δn ← ted-backtrace(x, y). lo← 1. hi← n.
3: while lo < hi do
4: j ← ⌊12 · (lo+ hi)⌋. z ← (δ1, . . . , δj)(x).
5: if f(z) 6= ℓ then
6: lo← j + 1.
7: else
8: hi← j.
9: end if
10: end while
11: return (δ1, . . . , δhi)(x)
12: end function
Note that we can upper-bound the length of δ¯ by |x| + |y|, because at worst we delete x
entirely and then insert y entirely. Accordingly, our attack finishes after at most O
(
log(|x|+
|y|)
)
steps/queries to f . Finally, because y is the closest tree with label ℓ to x, our attack
is guaranteed to yield a successful adversarial example if our prefix is shorter than half of δ¯,
because then d(x, z) = |prefix| < 12 |δ¯| =
1
2d(x, y) =
1
2
(
d(x, z) + d(z, y)
)
, which implies that
d(x, z) < d(z, y). In other words, we are guaranteed to find a solution to problem 1, in the
sense that our our label is guaranteed to change to ℓ, and that our solution is closest to x
along the shortest script δ¯ towards y.
4 Experiments
In our evaluation, we attack seven different tree classifiers on four data sets. As outcome
measures, we consider the success rate, i.e. the fraction of test data points for which the
attack could generate a successful adversarial example according to the definition in Figure 2;
and the distance ratio d(z, x)/d(z, y), i.e. how much closer z is to x compared to other points y
with the same label as z. To avoid excessive computation times, we abort random adversarial
attacks that have not succeeded after 100 tree edits. Accordingly, the distance ratio is not
available for random attacks that have been aborted, yielding some n.a. entries in our results
(Table 1).
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Our experimental hypotheses are that backtracing attacks succeed more often than random
attacks due to their targeted nature (H1), but that random attacks have lower distance ratios
(H2), because they have a larger search space from which to select close adversarials.
Datasets: We perform our evaluation on four tree classification data sets from [Gallicchio and Micheli,
2013, Paaßen et al., 2018], in particular MiniPalindrome and Sorting as data sets of Java pro-
grams, as well as Cystic and Leukemia from the biomedical domain. The number of trees in
each data set are 48, 64, 160, and 442 respectively. The latter three data sets are (imbalanced)
binary classification problems, the first is a six-class problem. We perform all experiments in
a crossvalidation with 6, 8, 10, and 10 folds for the respective data sets, following the protocol
of [Paaßen et al., 2018].
Classifiers: On each data set, we train seven different classifiers, namely five support
vector machines (SVM) with different kernels and two recursive neural network types. As
the first two kernels, we consider the double centering kernel (linear ; [Gisbrecht and Schleif,
2015]) based on the tree edit distance, and the radial basis function kernel (RBF ) k(x, y) =
exp
(
− 12 · d(x, y)
2/σ2
)
, for which we optimize the bandwidth parameter σ ∈ R+ in a nested
crossvalidation in the range {0.5, 1, 2} · d¯, where d¯ is the average tree edit distance in the data
set. We ensure positive semi-definiteness for these kernels via the clip eigenvalue correction
[Gisbrecht and Schleif, 2015]. Further, we consider three tree kernels, namely the subtree ker-
nel (ST ), which counts the number of shared proper subtrees, the subset tree kernel (SST ),
which counts the number of shared subset trees, and the partial tree kernel (PT ), which
counts the number of shared partial trees [Aiolli et al., 2011]. All three kernels have a de-
cay hyper-parameter λ, which regulates the influence of larger subtrees. We optimize this
hyper-parameter in a nested crossvalidation for each kernel in the range {0.001, 0.01, 0.1}.
For all SVM instances, we also optimized the regularization hyper-parameter C in the range
{0.1, 1, 10, 100}.
As neural network variations, we first consider recursive neural networks (Rec; [Sperduti and Starita,
1997]), which map a tree x(T1, . . . , Tm) to a vector by means of the recursive function
G(x(T1, . . . , Tm)) := sigm
(
W
x ·
∑m
i=1G(Ti) +
~bx
)
, where sigm(a) := 1/(1 + exp(−a)) is
the logistic function and W x ∈ Rn×n as well as ~bx ∈ Rn for all x ∈ A are the parameters of
the model. We classify a tree by means of another linear layer with one output for each of
the L classes, i.e. f(T ) := argmaxℓ[V ·G(T ) + ~c]ℓ, where V ∈ R
L×n and ~c ∈ RL are param-
eters of the model and [~v]ℓ denotes the ℓth entry of vector ~v. We trained the network using
the crossentropy loss and Adam[Kingma and Ba, 2015] as optimizer until the training loss
dropped below 0.01. Note that the number of embedding dimensions n is a hyper-parameter
of the model, which we fixed here to n = 10 as this was sufficient to achieve the desired
training loss. Finally, we consider tree echo state networks (TES ; [Gallicchio and Micheli,
2013]), which have the same architecture as recursive neural networks, but where the recur-
sive weight matrices W x ∈ Rn×n and the bias vectors ~bx ∈ Rn remain untrained after random
initialization. Only the output parameters V and ~c are trained via simple linear regression.
The scaling of the recursive weight matrices and n are hyper-parameters of the model, which
we optimized in a nested crossvalidation via grid search in the ranges {0.7, 0.9, 1, 1.5, 2} and
{10, 50, 100} respectively.
As implementations, we use the scikit-learn version of SVM, the edist package for the
tree edit distance and its backtracing1, the ptk toolbox2 for the ST, SST, and PT kernels
[Aiolli et al., 2011], a custom implementation of recursive neural networks using pytorch[Paszke et al.,
1https://gitlab.ub.uni-bielefeld.de/bpaassen/python-edit-distances
2http://joedsm.altervista.org/pythontreekernels.htm
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2017], and a custom implementation of tree echo state networks3. We perform all experiments
on a consumer grade laptop with an Intel i7 CPU.
Results and Discussion: Table 1 displays the mean classification error ± standard devia-
tion in crossvalidation, as well as the success rates and the distance ratios for random attacks
and backtracing attacks for all data sets and all classifiers.
We evaluate our results statistically by aggregating all crossvalidation folds across data
sets and comparing success rates and distance rations between in a a one-sided Wilcoxon
sign-rank test with Bonferroni correction. We observe that backtracing attacks have higher
success rates for the linear and RBF kernel SVM (p < 10−5), slightly higher rates for the ST
and SST kernels (p < 0.05), indistinguishable success for the PT kernel, and lower success
rates for the recursive and tree echo state networks (p < 0.01). This generally supports our
hypothesis that backtracing attacks have higher success rates (H1), except for both neural
network models. This is especially pronounced for Cystic and Leukemia data sets, where
random attacks against SVM models always failed.
Regarding H2, we observe that random attacks achieve lower distance ratios for the ST,
SST, and PT kernels (p < 0.01), and much lower ratios for recursive neural nets and tree echo
state nets (p < 10−5). For the linear and RBF kernel, the distance ratios are statistically
indistinguishable. This supports H2.
5 Conclusion
In this contribution, we have introduced a novel adversarial attack strategy for tree data based
on tree edits in one random and one backtracing variation. We observe that backtracing at-
tacks achieve more consistent and reliable success across data sets and classifiers compared to
the random baseline. Only for recursive neural networks are random attacks more successful.
We also observe that the search space for backtracing attacks may be too constrained because
random attacks generally find adversarials that are closer to the original sample. Future
research could therefore consider alternative search spaces, e.g. based on semantic consider-
ations. Most importantly, our research highlights the need for defense mechanisms against
adversarial attacks for tree classifiers, especially neural network models.
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